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ABSTRACT 
Elizabeth Brake presents a plausible contradiction: Promise breaking is regarded as 
impermissible, and marital promises are regarded as legitimate promises, however we take 
divorce, which is a breaking of a marital promise, as generally permissible. Brake’s response to 
the inconsistency of these beliefs is to assert that we misunderstand marital promises all together. 
She argues that marital vows misfire (that is they do not come to enforce promissory obligation) 
because they attempt to make promises about what one cannot control, one’s emotions—namely 
love.  My project will be in response to this view. First, I contend that Brake is wrong to think 
that marriage vows are illegitimate promises and second, I offer what I take to be a stronger 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
In her book Minimizing Marriage, Elizabeth Brake points out that when it comes to 
marriage and divorce, most people have contradictory beliefs.  In particular, most people hold: 
Promise-breaking is generally impermissible; marriage vows are promises; and unilateral divorce 
is generally permissible (even though it breaks the marriage promise).1 Brake’s response to what 
I term the divorce problem is to assert that marriage vows should not be understood as promises. 
Brake thinks that when people exchange marriage vows, they fail to make a promise. The 
problem, she thinks, is that, when people exchange marriage vows, they attempt to make 
promises about what they cannot control, their emotions, which in the case of marriage is love.  
And she thinks that people fail to make promises when they attempt to make promises about that 
which is not fully in their control—such as emotions.   In this thesis, I argue that the divorce 
problem is only apparent. First, I contend that Brake is mistaken to believe that marriage vows 
are not promises.  More precisely, I argue that we can make promises about love, as love is not 
only a complex emotion, but further requires perpetual acts of respect and care toward another 
person. Second, I claim that, nonetheless, unilateral divorce is morally permissible when an 
individual’s well-being will significantly suffer due to continuing in the marriage.   
 
In Section 1, I explain the divorce problem in greater detail, as well as Brake’s resolution.    
In Section 2, I refute Brake’s response to the divorce problem—that marriage vows are not 
promise—by providing an argument in support of the belief that we can successfully make 
promises about love. After refuting Brake’s response to the divorce problem, I posit my own 
resolution to the divorce problem in Section 3. I suggest that marriage vows can be permissibly 
 
1 This triad of inconsistent beliefs is hence force referred to as the divorce problem. 
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broken when the promiser’s well-being will significantly suffer due to continuing in the 
marriage. This projects concerns what Brake calls hardship cases. This excludes cases like abuse, 
in which it is clear that it is permissible for one  to exit a relationship, as well as cases of mere 
preference where one exits a relationship frivolously. Rather than these, this account is primarily 
concerned with cases of divorce for which the reasoning is based on a more moderate excuse.  
 
2 BRAKE’S VIEW 
Recall the divorce problem.  There is an apparent contradiction between the three 
following claims:  Promise-breaking is generally impermissible; marriage vows are promises; 
and unilateral divorce is generally permissible, even though it breaks the marriage promise. 
Brake asserts that there are three potential resolutions to the divorce problem. (1) One can simply 
reject the claim that unilateral divorce is permissible. Brake calls this the “hard-line” response, as 
it creates a high threshold for what constitutes a permissible reason for divorce. (2) One could 
assert that the types of circumstances that would allow for a morally permissible breaking of a 
vow do exist in failed relationships. She calls this the “Hardship” response as it suggests that 
there can exist sufficient hardships in a relationship to justify the breaking of wedding vows. Or 
one can (3) suggest that since marriage promises are contingent on love and happiness.  
 
 And finally, response (4), the one Brake endorses, is to accept that marriage promises 
simply are not really promises at all, because the promise misfires from the start insofar as those 
promising are making a vow over something they can’t control.2 
  
 
2 Brake 26 
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Her endorsement of (4) is informed by the belief that one cannot promise to do what one 
cannot do.3 For example, on Brake’s account, if Jane promises to take John to his favorite 
seafood restaurant, only to find out that the restaurant shut down months ago, then Jane did not 
fail to deliver her promise, as she actually never made the promise at all. She tried to make the 
promise but failed because the content of the promise was not something she could possibly 
deliver on.  
 
She acknowledges a possible objection to her view:  we often make promises about 
things we cannot control.  For example, we might promise to meet someone for lunch, but our 
ability to do so is contingent on other factors, namely the weather, traffic, and so on.4 However, 
Brake thinks these two instances fall under two different categories.5 In the lunch example, under 
normal circumstances it is reasonable that  the promiser will be able to keep her promise—that 
is, the promise is reasonable outside of any unforeseeable extenuating circumstance. Conversely, 
in the seafood restaurant example, there is no way for Jane to take her husband to the restaurant, 
even under the best circumstances, as it is closed—it would be a promise that would be 
impossible to keep in any circumstance (assuming the restaurant is permanently closed for good).   
So, according to Brake, it was never a successful promise to start. Some other examples of this 
kind of impossible promise, Brake suggests for clarity, include things like promising not to shoot 
oneself during Russian roulette or promising to succeed in a difficult surgery—these kinds of 
promises would be “foolhardy.”6  
 
3 Brake 32 
4 Brake 34 
5 Brake 33 
6 Brake 35 
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Brake argues that marriage vows fall under this same category of foolhardy, intended but 
failed promises. This is because, as she argues, we have as much control over our emotions as we 
do the bullet during Russian roulette or the outcome of a dangerous surgery. While it may be a 
“conceptual possibility” to be able to control one’s emotions well enough to guarantee that one 
can love another forever, Brake contends this is not something we can guarantee in practice.7 
This is not to say, as Brake points out, that it is an impossibility to love someone forever. For 
example, we might love our parents forever,  an intimate partner, or our child. Rather, the issue is 
whether we can control our emotions and guarantee that one can love someone forever. Thus, 
Brake has attempted to show that promises about things out of one’s control are not promises at 
all and, moreover, that one’s emotions are out of one’s full control. Therefore, promises to 
love—like marriage vows—cannot be promises at all.  
 
Brake entertains a number of important objections to her view.  The first she addresses is 
that marriage vows might be a promise to behave. But she points out, I think rightly so, that this 
account is too shallow to gauge what is happening.8 It seems that couples are making some 
emotional commitment to one another, not just a behavioral one. The second plausible objection 
she addresses is that vows are some predictive type of vow, similar to how a parent might tell her 
child that he will get an A in course at school if he works hard.9 This has immediate problems; 
Brake thinks, in a marriage setting, marriage vows do not explicitly say they are predictive, thus 
it can be misleading to the promisee. Further, viewing the vow in such a way alienates the 
promiser from her own emotions--it seems to be suggesting that that the promiser is just making 
 
7 Brake 35 
8 Brake 36  
9 Brake 36 
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predictions about her life, not making an active promise as an agent.10 Lastly, she counters the 
objection that marriage promises could work as promising as intention. She points out that this 
response is also flawed because promises cannot simply be statements of intention because 
promises create obligation, and a statement of intention to do something impossible cannot create 
an obligation.11 Thus, Brake has seemingly defended against these objectors; however she fails 
to adequately address all plausible responses. I will address one such solution in the following 
section.  
 
3 PROMISES WE MAKE 
In this section, I will ultimately contend that, contrary to Brake, we can successfully 
make promises to love one another. This argument will be achieved over the course of a few 
steps. First, I consider how we should understand vows.   Second, I posit that Brake’s mistake 
consists in adopting a too simplistic notion of love and, moreover, that adopting a more 
complex—and what I take to be a more precise—understanding of love, leads to the dissolution 
of Brake’s argument against promises of love.  
 
3.1 What is a Vow? 
Before arguing that marriage vows about love constitute a binding promise, it seems 
worthwhile to first define what we mean when we talk about vows and promises. For my 
purposes, I adopt an understanding of vows and promises as presented by Kyle Fruh.12 He claims 
that what separates a promise from a firm intention is the binding nature of a promise.13 Whereas 
 
10 Brake 37 
11 Brake 37 
12 Fruh 858–880 
13 Fruh 859 
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with a firm intention a changing of mind would be permissible, this is no longer the case with a 
promise—one is bound to the promise. That is, when one makes a promise a moral obligation is 
generated. One could delve much more deeply into the metaphysics of promises, but here it is 
sufficient to recognize a promise is a moral obligation generating phenomena that results in 
morally-binding commitment.  
  
Vows, in contrast to a single promise, require one to take on a breadth of obligations.14 
Take, for instance, wedding vows. Wedding vows serve the main goal of obligating people to 
each other. However, it is clear there are a plethora of obligations that come with this—a couple 
makes a promise to stay with another until  death, to support each other through sickness or 
health, to love. So,  a vow is much more complex than a promise to, say, pick one’s brother up 
from the airport. When one makes a vow, one is not entering into a single obligation, but rather 
one is promising that one will do a number of things related to one’s relationship.    
 
This also means that there can be much more at stake concerning a vow than a promise15 
If  one fails to pick up her brother from the airport after making a promise to do so, it is certainly 
the case that reparations and apologies are owed, but it does not appear to be as simple when 
considering the breaking of a vow. Vows are often much more intimate and involve the identity 
of the person themselves—that is, when making a vow a person seems to be “taking a stand” on 
the person that they are, to break the vow is to fail to be that person.16 Like promises, there is 
 
14 Fruh 864 
15 Fruh 865 
16 Fruh 865 
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much more one could say about vows, however, it is sufficient for this project to suggest that 
vows are typically more complex than promises.  
 
3.2 Promise We Can Make 
Equipped with a working understanding of promises and vows, it is easier to see where 
Brake’s analysis goes wrong.   To reiterate, Brake’s resolution to the divorce problem is to posit 
that marriage vows are not promises at all, and thus do not bind one to the kind of promissory 
obligation that is ostensibly broken in a divorce. The rationale is that one cannot make promises 
about what one cannot control, and one cannot control an emotion like love.  
 
Brake seems to characterize love as something that happens to one without one willing it, 
and that it comes and goes on its own. I contend that love is not this fickle. Love is better 
understood as something much more active—not solely something that just happens to 
someone.17 Love is distinct from many other emotions because it requires some self-reflection 
and is responsive to reason (but not entirely so).18 It is different from, say,  sadness, which we 
cannot control and doesn’t seem to respond to reason.  This means, regarding love, there is some 
level of agency present—you could ask another why they love someone, and that person could 
ostensibly give reason beyond just “it happened to me.”  
  
This complexity tells us that we cannot quickly write off love as an emotion over which 
we have no control, even if we cannot control it entirely.  Love is responsive to reason to some 
degree. However, it is not critical to my project to suggest that love is fully within our control.  
 
17 Ebels-Duggan 1 
18 Ebels-Duggan 4 
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Rather, in response to Brake, I posit that when we make vows about love, we are not making 
promises merely about our emotional states, rather we’re making vows about the extent to which 
we are willing to go to foster feelings of love and to protect a loving relationship so that we can 
have a successful partnership.  
 
At first, a view like this might seem to just be suggesting that a marriage vow is a 
promise about behavior, a view which Brake refutes.19 But this view, I contend, has more 
complexity than Brake allows. She suggests that couples who get married and partake in vows 
are not thinking about promising to undertake the actions that will lead to a loving relationship.20 
 
I think this is a crude view of vows and couple who make themthem. Spouses, who are 
sincere in their vows to each other, are not solely concerned with the emotional feelings they 
have for one another. Rather, they are entering into an intimate partnership. This means that they 
are promising each other certain behavior in connection with their emotional intimacy . It would 
seem shallow to suggest that a couple making vows to one another were merely promising to 
love one another, but not promising to participate in acts that facilitated that love -like caring for 
each other in sickness or in health and to avoid acts that would undermine it - like XXXXX.  
 
Love is not infatuation. Love requires care, respect, and critical reflection on the well-
being of another.21 All of these require particular behaviors; care means being tentative to 
another needs, respect means apologizing and talking after a fight, reflection requires active and 
 
19 Brake 37  
20 Brake 38 
21 Rorty 13 
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deliberate thought, and so on. Love goes further than just enjoying another person, it requires a 
constant and active deliberate effort to have a flourishing relationship with another person.22 
Brake suggests that those entering into marriage vows are not considering these behaviors and 
are rather solely focused on the emotion. I disagree, there is no love without action and behavior 
to facilitate it, and those entering into serious and committed loving relationships would have 
this, not just a promise to keep up a romantic feeling, at the forefront when making a vow to their 
partner. 
 
With this more robust understanding of love, it is more clear  how we can make promises 
about love. Not only is one making a promise about love when entering into a marriage vow but 
recall earlier how vows were defined. A vow is a suite of obligations one enters into that is tied 
to their identify as a person. A marriage vow is not a promise to maintain emotional love, as 
Brake suggests. It is a vow that is made between two people that obligates them to the suite of 
obligations that goes along with loving another person. This includes caring for, respecting, 
prioritizing the needs and well-being of one’s partner. We can make promises about behavior 
and actions, so if one adopts this more robust, behavior-driven, notion of love, then it is possible 
to make successful promises about love.  
 
In this section I posited what I take to be a plausible understanding of promises and vows. 
Moreover, I argued against Brake’s belief that marriage vows are not promises by suggesting 
that her view of love is too simplistic , and that with a more robust understanding of love one can 
 
22 Rorty 2 
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understand marriage vows as making a complex accummilation of promises, or a vow, about 
behavior.  
 
This concludes the first step of my project which was aimed at arguing that we can make 
promises about love. The remainder of this paper will be aimed at the second step of my 
project—namely suggesting a stronger resolution to the divorce problem.  
 
4 PROMISES WE BREAK 
We want (and need) promises to be binding. If my friend promises to pick me up from 
the airport, I need  to have confidence that my friend will be there when my plane lands. Our 
mundane day-to-day life requires people to make promises and commitments to one another—
we rely on people keeping their word. This means large social problems would come about if we 
lessened the moral commitment that promises entail. 
 
Societal reliance on promises makes the notion of morally permissible divorce seem too 
weak. If marriage vows can be unilaterally broken, and promises can be exited on a whim, what 
prevents my friend from not showing up to pick me up from the airport, what keeps the shop 
owner committed to giving me the goods I purchased. It is insufficient to simply say that 
marriage promises are different from other promises, such that we are okay with breaking them, 
but not others —in this event, it becomes a case of cherry-picking when it is, or is not, 




 In this section, I tackle this issue. I explain how one can simultaneously hold, that 
promises are binding and critically important to uphold, while also maintaining that unilateral 
divorce is morally permissible. To do so, I rely on the assumption that one can permissibly break 
a promise in the face of significant harm—an assumption that  I defend below.   
 
4.1 Promises Breaking in the Face of Harm 
Imagine Molly has an illness which requires her to stay in the hospital for an extensive 
period of time. Lizzie promised Molly that she will visit her each day to keep her company. 
Assume Molly accepts her promise and Lizzie has entered into a promissory obligation. Lizzie 
keeps her promise and continues to visit Molly in the hospital.  At some point, however, the 
hospital changes their sanitation supplies—the disinfectant, Lizzie discovers, causes her to have 
severe allergic reaction that causes her an uncomfortable rash. She can no longer enter the 
hospital without having a reaction, so she stops visiting Molly. 
 
It seems here that Lizzie has broken her promise—she no longer visits Molly  as she said 
she would. However, a pressing moral issue is whether Lizzie can be held morally culpable for 
the breaking of the promise. Clearly, the answer here seems to be no. No one would expect or 
insist that Lizzie continue to go to the hospital despite the obvious damage it does to her.  
 
This thought experiment suggests that there are circumstances in which one can be 
excused from keeping a promise.. Indeed, there are lots of cases in which we think that people 
can break their promises:  if someone loses her job, she doesn’t have to keep expensive dinner 
dates or if there is bad weather, one doesn’t have to pick up friend at the airport.  These are all 
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examples of cases in which a reasonable individual could break their promise without being 
considered morally culpable.  
 
One could present a much longer view on particular cases in which one can permissibly 
break promises—however that extends further than what is necessary for this project. Rather, it 
is sufficient for my argument to show that it is plausible that one may break a promise en 
following through with that promise may cause significant harm to the promiser.  
 
4.2 Brake’s Response 
Brake seems to anticipate this sort of view of promissory obligation and argues that 
morality requires promise-keeping—even if the cost is high for the promiser. For this, she gives 
the example of Marcel and Albertine.23 Marcel has promised to purchase a yacht for Albertine. 
However, Marcel comes to realize that high expense of yachts and realizes that sacrificing his 
money to buy the yacht for Albertine will lead him to no longer achieve two of his desires—
namely going to Venice and impressing his neighbors. Brakes thinks that if one concludes that 
Marcel still owes Albertine a yacht, then one must also accept that one owes it to their spouse to 
stay in the marriage.  
 
I contend that Brake’s analogy here fails because the two situations are not as comparable 
as she might suggest. The difference being the extent to which each is facing harm. In Marcel’s 
case, if the extent of the harm is that he can no longer go to Italy nor impressive his neighbors, it 
seems reasonable that one might conclude that this is not significant enough to excuse him from 
 
23 Brake 29 
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his promise. Contra, if buying the yacht would cause Marcel to go homeless and make it difficult 
for him obtain food and other basic necessities for the remainder of his life, one might view the 
situation differently—that is, a reasonable individual would be much more likely to be willing to 
excuse Marcel from his promise.  
 
If we think of the circumstances around divorce as more akin to the latter than the former, 
then it becomes clearer how we might consistently hold that Marcel needs to keep his promise to 
purchase the yacht, whereas the spouse can be excused from her marriage if we assume that 
staying in the marriage will cause significant harm to the individual. 
  
All to say, Brake does not seem to give charitable credit to the notion that one can exit a 
promise if she experiences significant harm. In this section, I have suggested that a reasonable 
person would not hold a promiser morally culpable for exiting a promise that was causing her 
harm. And moreover, I argued that Brake’s attempt to defend a view that harm is insufficient for 
exiting a promise, fails.  In the next section, I argue that a particular type of harm, namely harm 
to well-being, constitutes at least one way in which an individual can be morally excused from 
her marriage vows.  
 
5 DAMAGE TO WELL-BEING AS A SIGNIFICANT HARM 
5.1 What is Well-Being 
Thus far, I have worked to support the view that facing a significant harm gives a 
promisee grounds to exit an obligation permissibly. I further this argument here by suggesting 
that damage to one’s overall well-being constitutes this kind of significant harm. However, 
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before I do so, it is important to define what “well-being” means in this context as it can be a 
somewhat loaded term with many interpretations.  
 
Before defining well-being, it is worthwhile to a step back and to understand what one 
means by happiness. For my purposes, I adopt Daniel Haybron’s definition. He defines one 
being in a state of  happiness when  “one’s emotional condition [is] favorable on the whole,” 
generally speaking, it is the “opposite of anxiety and depression.”24 Happiness then is the 
psychological component of well-being. However, to be happy is not, necessarily, to be well. 
  
Well-being is a bit more difficult to define than happiness. One way to understand well-
being is in terms of whether or not a life is good. One can evaluate whether a life is good with 
questions like, “is life X such a life which with the individual could be justifiably be satisfied.” 
Or perhaps, in simpler terms, whether a person giving a eulogy for person X could sincerely say 
that X lead a good life.25 This is a quite rough way of understanding these notions, but it is 
sufficient enough for this project to understand well-being (roughly) as a combination of both 
being psychologically happy and leading a good life.  
 
There is a plurality of views one could adopt in regard to what it takes to achieve well-
being.26 However, there is common ground which they all share. Namely, it seems generally 
agreed upon that it is plausibly such that well-being requires, at least, an individual to have 
 
24 Haybron 28 
25 Haybron 110 
26 Haybron succinctly describes each of these theories well in his book, 85 
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autonomy and to be able to makes decisions for herself in regard to prioritizing and participating 
in activities and habits that are fulfilling to her.  
 
To summarize the preceding discussion, to have well-being is to have both a generally 
positive emotional and psychological state, as well as to lead (or be leading) a life that is 
generally positive and favorable. And achieving (or at least striving toward) well-being consists 
in one being able to set aspirations for herself, as well as having the ability to achieve (or work 
toward) these aspirations in a way that is fulfilling to her.  
 
5.2 Why Be Well 
After understanding what well-being is, a further question might be in regard to why we 
ought to strive for well-being, and moreover why the lack of well-being is such a significant 
damage. It might seem like happiness is sufficient; however, I contend that individuals ought to 
be able to pursue well-being beyond just happiness. To illustrate what happiness without well-
being looks like, I offer an example. Imagine Leah. Leah has a generally happy life free from 
stress, depression, and anxiety. She has enough money to take care of herself comfortably and 
works a job she enjoys. Overall, she has a happy life that would generally be perceived as 
positive. However, perhaps she deeply enjoys drawing extremely-detailed portraits, but she 
recently suffered an injury in her wrist that was severe enough that it hindered her ability to 
draw, not just temporarily but for the rest of her life. Despite this, she maintains a generally 




In Leah’s case, we have no reason to say she is not happy. However, we can say that she 
has, to some extent, had her overall well-being hindered due to the circumstances as she is no 
longer able to do the activity she finds fulfilling. While this might not be the case of an 
extremely significant harm—Leah is still able to, all things considered, lead a good life—it does 
illustrate that a hindrance of well-being constitutes harm of some sort.  
 
5.3 Significant Harms to Well-Being 
Extrapolating this idea back into a marriage case, let us draw another example. Let us say 
that Sarah married her husband at a young age. They had a been married a few years when Sarah 
finds that she has a real love for theatre, so much in fact that it becomes something with which 
she begins to define her identity. Her husband has a job in Michigan (where there is little 
opportunity for participation in theatre) that he in deeply invested in and does not desire to leave. 
Further, he desires to have children in the near future.  
 
If  Sarah stays with her husband, she will sustain a harm to her well-being. She will not 
be able to work toward her theatre related goals due to both her location and the time she will 
need to spend with her children. It is quite plausible that this will damage her well-being so 
profoundly that her happiness is even reduced significantly.  
 
The intuitive response to this might perhaps be that Sarah made a vow to her husband. 
That she chose to enter a relationship with him, and in turn forfeited her ability to participate in 
some activities, like participating in theatre in a large city. However, I refer back to the example 
of Lizzie visiting Molly in the hospital. When Lizzie promises to visit Molly, we do not intuit 
17 
 
that Lizzie has forfeited her rights to her well-being in the process—to think so would be to 
suggest that Lizzie ought to be required to attend the hospital, despite it causing her profound 
illness.  
 
Sarah has the same right to her emotional well-being as Lizzie does to her physical well-
being. If that is the case, as I contend it is, then it follows that Sarah has no more obligation to 
stay with her husband at the expense of her dreams and sincere desires than Lizzie has to visit 
Molly at the expense of her physical health. 
 
Thus, I suggest that if Sarah instigates a unilateral divorce with her husband, and thus 
breaking the promise she made, she is doing so permissibly. This is not to say that Sarah has not 
hurt her husband to some extent, nor that it is the morally ideal situation. But it is to say that her 
breaking of her promise was done with sufficient justification to render it morally permissible.  
 
The breaking of the promise can be permissible in any case in which one’s well-being is 
sufficiently strained. This often occurs when an individual’s life goal changes. As another 
example, suppose Marcel married his spouse, and at the time of their vows their life goals and 
desired aligned. It seems entirely plausible that over time Marcel could change with age and life 
experience—perhaps his desire for children has waned, or his priorities has realigned in such a 
way that they are no longer compatible with his partners. In this case, just like Sarah, Marcel’s 
overall well-being is at risk if he becomes unable to fulfill his desires in a way he feels 
appropriate. It would be up to Marcel to weigh the potential harm to maintaining the relationship. 
18 
 
However, if he concludes that potential harm is too significant, then we should take his 
separation from the marriage to be permissible, just like Sarah’s. 
 
If we take overall well-being, as I have described here, as serious as physical well-being, 
as I contend, we should, then we are obligated to recognize that significant harm to overall well-
being is grounds for permissible promise breaking is, just a significant harm to physical well-
being is. Recall the divorce problem: Promise-breaking is generally impermissible; marriage 
vows are promises; and unilateral divorce is generally permissible (even though it breaks the 
marriage promise. One does not have to deny any of these premises, as Brake does, to fix the 
apparent contradiction. Rather, as I have shown, showing that promising breaking is morally 
permissible in particular cases—namely cases that involve significant harm to well-being—
resolves the concern posed by Brake.  
 
6 CONCLUSION 
My project had two distinct goals. The first was to suggest that Brake’s way of resolving 
the divorce problem—by suggesting that marriage vows are not promises at all—fails as it seems 
to misinterpret what kind of promises we make to one another when we make promises about 
Love. I argued that making promises regarding love does not equate to making a promise about 
our future emotional state. Rather than making a marriage vow actually requires committing to a 
suite of promises—some of which might be emotional, but many of which are based in our 
actions and efforts toward another person and a shared relationship. Thus, concluded that Brake 




My second goal in the project was to propose a new resolution to the divorce problem. I 
first suggested that we have sufficient grounds to permissibly exit a promise when fulfilling it 
harms us. Moreover, I showed that a harm to well-being suffices as this kind of harm. Thus, 
suggesting that a promiser can permissibly exit a promise when fulfilling it would cause harm. 
Finally, I extrapolated this notion back to marriage, and showed that, if we are committed to 
harms to overall well-being being significant harms, one can unilaterally choose to exit a 
marriage vow permissibly, if staying in the marriage would cause her to sustain significant harm 
to her well-being. Overall, I have both rebutted Brake’s solution to the divorce problem, as well 
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